Charles Sanders Peirce concepts and Adventist thinking compared

by koot van wyk Seoul South Korea 4 February 2009

Source: (Charles Sanders Peirce, "How to make clear our ideas" Popular Science Monthly vol. 12 [January 1878]: 286-302).

Introduction

Charles Sanders Peirce (pronounced purse) (September 10, 1839 – April 19, 1914) was an American logician, mathematician, philosopher, and scientist, born in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Peirce was educated as a chemist and employed as a scientist for 30 years. It is largely his contributions to logic, mathematics, philosophy, and semiotics (and his founding of pragmatism) that is appreciated today.

Peirce had a physical defect that he suffered from some facial "pullings" and also did his wife left him early. About twenty years he lived with a woman although not divorced from his first wife. When she finally came to divorce him, Harvard University was shocked that he could live with another worman and as a result of that, he was dishonored. He could not get a work again at any university he applied afterwards.

Peirce manuscripts are largerly not published and Harvard who had it in their possession kept it for nearly half a century before they started opening it up to the public.

It is said that he was born before his time.

Later philosophers like Martin Buber, Cohen, R. Bultmann, Ludwig Wittgenstein were all in one way or another influenced by Peirce.

Peirce scholars only really came to light in the Post-War II era.

What interest us about Peirce is that he seems to discuss all systems of thought, those working with tenacity, with authority, with a-priori and his own system: those working with scientific inquiry. He favors his own system but he has something good to say for the system like that of Ellen G. White his contemporary. He does not mention her by name but he said that they are good in character and he envy them how they can come to the abyss of no-data and just jump without rationality or reason guiding them. That faith he really admires.

What is to follow is some key ideas from the original works of Peirce available online and an attempt to compare these ideas to that of Adventism.

Van Wyk Evaluation of Peirce

1. Peirce is definitely a philosopher and probably one of the rare philosophers of the USA continent.

a. One's definition of philosopher needs here to be proper: not only anti-biblical thinkers are philosophers, Edward Heppenstall and Ellen White and many other American thinkers are also philosophers.

b. There is a philosopher of truth and a philospher of humanism, the two are not the same.

c. It is not fair to only count the philospher of humanism, atheism, nihilism, etc. as philosophers and people like Karl Barth who focus on transcendentalism as not a philospher.

2. He definitely was born one hundred years too early.

3. From reading his works online, it appears that one must be careful in one's assessments of him since he is critical to both sides of a coin.

4. Being critical to both sides of a coin is typical of relativism since World War II.

5. But, in some statements he is the same as post-modernism which is critical of Modernism.

6. Here is what happened. He lived during the time of atheism, rationalism, positivism.

a) He reasoned positivism through but are critical of arrogant statements by them.

b) He actually criticizes two sides of a coin: normativism on one side denying the metaphysical and normativism on the other side accepting the transcendental in their epistemology or thinking.

c) He criticize relativism or modernism [even before it existed, thus theoretically] by taking a post-modern stance: if metaphysics should not be taken seriously but only scientific inquiry, and if scientific inquiry has almost no certain norm at all [relativism] then please leave me alone [post-modernism]. He lived with a woman before he was legally devorced from his previous wife for 20 years and Harvard fired him for that, something that makes us wonder how far and in what way 2009 Harvard come up to the standard? Not to say they did not right, the question is, what about 2009 standard?

7. Another point about Peirce is crucial: all scholars have a early, middle and later period in their thinking. There are twists and turns. Since Peirce published in 1906 his other proof for the existence of God, one wonders how many essays unpublished in the Harvard archives are dealing with the subject of God and theology, in a period before his death in 1914?

8. A full evaluation of Peirce is thus from a scientific point not possible since even the articles published by Harvard may be selective trying to either proof modernism and post- modernism and cancelling? all his theological later articles, if they exist? Conspiracy theory is probably not applicable here but the main point is, one has to see the toto to really be able to give proper space to the man.



Definition of a clear idea"A clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it. If it fails of this clearness, it is said to be obscure" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Definition of a distinct idea

"A distinct idea is defined as one which contains nothing which is not clear" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Contents of an idea

"[B]y the contents of an idea logicians understand whatever is contained in its definition" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Purpose of thought and belief

"The purpose of thought is belief and the purpose of belief is habit" (Charles Sanders Peirce, "How to make clear our ideas" Popular Science Monthly vol. 12 [January 1878]: 286- 302).

Dangers of false distinctions

"False distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really different" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

"[It is deception of thought] to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Function of thought

"[T]he whole function of thought is to produce habits of action" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

The ["fruits of the Spirit explains the Spirit - Practice what one preaches defines the meaning of the preaching - practice of a theory provides the meaning of the theory = van wyk]

"To develop its meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Identity of a habit

"[T]he identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

"What the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act. As for the when, every stimulus to action is derived from perception; as for the how, every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Descartes concept of clear idea and distinct idea and problems with his concepts

"When Descartes set about the reconstruction of philosophy, his first step was to (theoretically) permit skepticism and to discard the practice of the schoolmen of looking to authority as the ultimate source of truth. That done, he sought a more natural fountain of true principles, and thought he found it in the human mind; thus passing, in the directest way, from the method of authority to that of apriority, as described in my first paper. Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason. But since, evidently, not all ideas are true, he was led to note, as the first condition of infallibility, that they must be clear. The distinction between an idea seeming clear and really being so, never occurred to him. Trusting to introspection, as he did, even for a knowledge of external things, why should he question its testimony in respect to the contents of our own minds? But then, I suppose, seeing men, who seemed to be quite clear and positive, holding opposite opinions upon fundamental principles, he was further led to say that clearness of ideas is not sufficient, but that they need also to be distinct, i.e., to have nothing unclear about them. What he probably meant by this (for he did not explain himself with precision) was, that they must sustain the test of dialectical examination; that they must not only seem clear at the outset, but that discussion must never be able to bring to light points of obscurity connected with them" (Peirce 1878: 286- 302).

van wyk notes:

1. The sentence by Peirce 1878: 286-302: "Self-consciousness was to furnish us with our fundamental truths, and to decide what was agreeable to reason", was later to become the cornerstone of the key to hermeneutics by F. Schleiermacher, M. Heidegger and R. Bultmann (A. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description [1980]: 106).

2. These later scholars also held to the hermeneutical circle that pre-understanding is necessary to gain understanding.

3. Pre-understanding was the chain that locked meaning and selfunderstanding or rediscovery of the I in the Thou or selfconsciousness, was to be the key to unlock this chain and meaning.

Leibnitz evaluated by Peirce

"This great and singular genius was as remarkable for what he failed to see as for what he saw. That a piece of mechanism could not do work perpetually without being fed with power in some form, was a thing perfectly apparent to him; yet he did not understand that the machinery of the mind can only transform knowledge, but never originate it, unless it be fed with facts of observation. He thus missed the most essential point of the Cartesian philosophy, which is, that to accept propositions which seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which, whether it be logical or illogical, we cannot help doing. Instead of regarding the matter in this way, he sought to reduce the first principles of science to two classes, those which cannot be denied without self-contradiction, and those which result from the principle of sufficient reason (of which more anon), and was apparently unaware of the great difference between his position and that of Descartes. So he reverted to the old trivialities of logic; and, above all, abstract definitions played a great part in his philosophy. It was quite natural, therefore, that on observing that the method of Descartes labored under the difficulty that we may seem to ourselves to have clear apprehensions of ideas which in truth are very hazy, no better remedy occurred to him than to require an abstract definition of every important term. Accordingly, in adopting the distinction of clear and distinct notions, he described the latter quality as the clear apprehension of everything contained in the definition; and the books have ever since copied his words. There is no danger that his chimerical scheme will ever again be over-valued. Nothing new can ever be learned by analyzing definitions. Nevertheless, our existing beliefs can be set in order by this process, and order is an essential element of intellectual economy, as of every other. It may be acknowledged, therefore, that the books are right in making familiarity with a notion the first step toward clearness of apprehension, and the defining of it the second. But in omitting all mention of any higher perspicuity of thought, they simply mirror a philosophy which was exploded a hundred years ago" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Few clear ideas more valuable than many confused ideas

"For an individual, however, there can be no question that a few clear ideas are worth more than many confused ones" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

van wyk notes:

1. This sentence of Peirce is very striking: "But in omitting all mention of any higher perspicuity of thought, they simply mirror a philosophy which was exploded a hundred years ago" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

2. First of all, to talk about Leibnitz in context, he refers to the latter part of the 18th century when the hermeneutics of suspicion was breaking down authority in the Word of God held by Pietists and F. Schleiermacher gladly participated in this pessimistic movement [Semler, Leibnitz, Goethe, Barhdt also participated in hermeneutics of suspicion].

3. However, in describing the phenomenon of Leibnitz we find a "But" in Peirce thus a "to the contrary" word.

4. It appears as if Peirce is suggesting that they [hermeneutics of suspicion movement of the 18th century] failed because they did not "mention of any higher perspicuity of thought". What this higher clarity of thought is, one wonders? Why is it "higher" and what is "lower"?

clearness of thought of higher grade

Peirce definiton and use of Doubt and Belief

"Doubt and Belief, as the words are commonly employed, relate to religious or other grave discussions. But here I use them to designate the starting of any question, no matter how small or how great, and the resolution of it" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Consciousness, sensations, thought

"These two sorts of objects, what we are immediately conscious of and what we are mediately conscious of, are found in all consciousness. Some elements (the sensations) are completely present at every instant so long as they last, while others (like thought) are actions having beginning, middle, and end, and consist in a congruence in the succession of sensations which flow through the mind. They cannot be immediately present to us, but must cover some portion of the past or future. Thought is a thread of melody running through the succession of our sensations" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

van wyk notes:

1. Peirce claims that sensations deals with the present, thoughts with the past and future but have a beginning, middle and end role in the continuation or succession of sensations.

2. Sensations and thoughts are objects found in consciousness.

Beliefs different but sharing in same doubt are not different beliefs

"The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

van wyk notes:

1. Theological seminaries are from different beliefs.

2. If they share the same hermeneutics of suspicion or hermeneutics of doubt [e.g. the inroads of historical-critical analysis in Biblical literature], then they are no longer different beliefs but are the same.

3. A Catholic scholar and a Protestant scholar who shares the same doubts about the authenticity of the Word of God, is not longer "Catholic" or "Scholar" but brothers of doubt linked with their methods of hermeneutics of suspicion.

4. An Adventist and a Catholic or a Jew, who shares in the doubts about the seven day week of Genesis 1 as literal seven days, or doubts in the books of the Pentateuch been written by Moses, is no longer an "Adventist" and no longer a "Catholic", they are brothers linked by their doubts and deviant considerations. However, one has to qualify. The Catholics of yesteryears believed like Adventists not in historical-criticism, even as late as 1902 but the conventional position of Catholics in the late 1970 until contemporary times, are all adhering to the historical-critical method. That includes pope Ratzinger who is sold out on relecturing criticism which is a mixture "crossbreed" of the Canon criticism of Childs and historical-critical studies of the past.

Clinging to meaningless lifestyles and ideas

"Many a man has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea, too meaningless to be positively false; he has, nevertheless, passionately loved it, has made it his companion by day and by night, and has given to it his strength and his life, leaving all other occupations for its sake, and in short has lived with it and for it, until it has become, as it were, flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone; and then he has waked up some bright morning to find it gone, clean vanished away like the beautiful Melusina of the fable, and the essence of his life gone with it" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Peirce on Transubstantion

"To see what this principle leads to, consider in the light of it such a doctrine as that of transubstantiation. The Protestant churches generally hold that the elements of the sacrament are flesh and blood only in a tropical sense; they nourish our souls as meat and the juice of it would our bodies. But the Catholics maintain that they are literally just meat and blood; although they possess all the sensible qualities of wafer-cakes and diluted wine. But we can have no conception of wine except what may enter into a belief, either—

1. That this, that, or the other, is wine; or,

2. That wine possesses certain properties.

Such beliefs are nothing but self-notifications that we should, upon occasion, act in regard to such things as we believe to be wine according to the qualities which we believe wine to possess. The occasion of such action would be some sensible perception, the motive of it to produce some sensible result. Thus our action has exclusive reference to what affects the senses, our habit has the same bearing as our action, our belief the same as our habit, our conception the same as our belief; and we can consequently mean nothing by wine but what has certain effects, direct or indirect, upon our senses; and to talk of something as having all the sensible characters of wine, yet being in reality blood, is senseless jargon. Now, it is not my object to pursue the theological question; and having used it as a logical example I drop it, without caring to anticipate the theologian’s reply. I only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. It is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to its only function. It is foolish for Catholics and Protestants to fancy themselves in disagreement about the elements of the sacrament, if they agree in regard to all their sensible effects, here and hereafter" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

 

how to know truth and falsehood

"Still, it will sometimes strike a scientific man that the philosophers have been less intent on finding out what the facts are, than on inquiring what belief is most in harmony with their system" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

"It is certainly important to know how to make our ideas clear, but they may be ever so clear without being true" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

"But I know that in the matter of ideas the public prefer the cheap and nasty" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

Scientific inquiry over metaphysics

"It seems to me, however, that we have, by the application of our rule, reached so clear an apprehension of what we mean by reality, and of the fact which the idea rests on, that we should not, perhaps, be making a pretension so presumptuous as it would be singular, if we were to offer a metaphysical theory of existence for universal acceptance among those who employ the scientific method of fixing belief. However, as metaphysics is a subject much more curious than useful, the knowledge of which, like that of a sunken reef, serves chiefly to enable us to keep clear of it, I will not trouble the reader with any more Ontology at this moment" (Peirce 1878: 286-302).

to be continued